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Fishing is a global industry. While many populations, or stocks, of
fish lie wholly within the jurisdiction of one nation, many other fish
populations either straddle national boundaries or migrate freely from
the jurisdictional waters of one nation to the international high seas to
the jurisdictional waters of another nation. The trade in fish is similarly
unrestricted by national boundaries. A fish market in the United States
might sell swordfish and tuna caught on the Atlantic or Pacific high seas
by an Asian or European vessel, Patagonian toothfish (sold as Chilean
seabass) caught in the Antarctic high seas by vessels from Spain, grouper
caught in Southeast Asia, or orange roughy, a deep-sea fish caught in
New Zealand. In fact, over eighty percent of the seafood sold in the
United States is imported.' The top countries exporting to the United
States include China, Thailand, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Indonesia, and
Vietnam.2 Thirty-seven percent of global fish production is traded inter-
nationally, comprising up to thirteen percent of global agricultural trade.'
Governments, international organizations, Oceana,4  and other
non-governmental organizations have long realized that this global food
supply is in peril. Because both the resource, and the trade in the re-
source, extends beyond national boundaries, sustaining the world's
fisheries will not be possible without effective international regulation.
Unfortunately both national and international regulatory schemes are
predicated on a model of fishery management that fails to address the
1. National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, Fish Watch-US Seafood Facts, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/fishwatch/trade and_
aquaculture.htm (last visited June 14, 2009).
2. National Marine Fisheries Service, Top Exporters the US Imports From, 2007,
Volume, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/fishwatchlimages/imporLexporters_2007_exp.gif (last
visited June 14, 2009).
3. INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., THE WORLD BANK, THE SUNKEN
BILLIONS: THE ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR FISHERIES REFORM 5 (2008) [hereinafter SUN-
KEN BILLIONS].
4. Oceana is the world's leading international nonprofit organization dedicated to pro-
tecting and restoring the world's oceans. Oceana's teams of marine scientists, economists,
lawyers, and advocates win specific and concrete policy changes to reduce pollution and to
prevent the irreversible collapse of fish populations, marine mammals, and other sea life. For
more information, see http://www.oceana.org (last visited June 14, 2009).
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practical realities of controlling human impacts on complex ecosystems
and the perverse economic incentives that lead to overfishing. Further-
more, international fisheries treaties are not strongly enforceable. Part I
of this Essay marshals the evidence that fisheries around the world are in
peril from destructive fishing practices. Part II argues that most fisheries
management regimes are ineffective at counteracting the political pres-
sures and economic incentives that lead to unsustainable fishing. Part II1
makes the case that government subsidies are major enablers of overfish-
ing. The fourth and final Part discusses the continuing efforts to use
international trade regulation to eliminate overfishing subsidies and halt
the collapse of the world's marine fish populations.
I. FISHERIES AROUND THE WORLD ARE IN PERIL FROM
DESTRUCTIVE FISHING PRACTICES
The oceans constitute approximately ninety-nine percent of Earth's
livable environment.5 While carbon dioxide and other emissions threaten
future catastrophic damage to the oceans through global climate change
and ocean acidification, overfishing alone is causing devastating injury
right now. The extent of the injury is considerable. Looking only at the
economic loss from the decline of commercial fish populations and over-
investment in poorly regulated fisheries, the global fishing industry loses
$50 billion in economic benefits each year and has lost $2 trillion in
economic benefits over the previous three decades.6
Lay people and experts alike used to think that marine fisheries were
inexhaustible. Thus, in as late as 1855, the Canadian Ministry of Agri-
culture pronounced that "[u]nless the order of nature is overthrown, for
centuries to come our fisheries will continue to be fertile."7 This Cana-
dian quote is a favorite in the literature, given the famous collapse of the
Newfoundland cod fishery in the twentieth century. In fact, although
some scientists were already realizing the danger of overexploitation, the
impression that the ocean's resources were without limit had a strong
grip on even the foremost experts for a long time. As late as 1883, the
great biologist T.H. Huxley thought that, although salmon rivers and
5. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Oceanography, Living
Ocean, http://nasascience.nasa.gov/earth-science/oceanography/living-ocean/?searchterm=
the%201iving%20ocean (last visited June 14, 2009) (stating that oceans cover about 70% of
the Earth's surface and constitute 99% of the habitable space on the planet).
6. SUNKEN BILLIONS, supra note 3, at ix.
7. MARK KURLANSKY, COD: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT CHANGED THE WORLD
32 (1997).
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oyster beds could be exhausted, there were so many fish like cod out in
the sea that we could never make a dent in their numbers.8
A closer look at the archaeological and historical record suggests,
however, that this impression of limitless oceans immune to injury may
be a product of ignorance of historical declines in the abundance of ma-
rine resources, ignorance among the general public concerning the
current state of marine resources, and ignorance concerning the ever-
increasing impact that people are having on the oceans.
The archaeological record suggests that people were fishing inten-
sively as much as 90,000 years ago. 9 Even in pre-industrial times
technology was advanced enough to significantly deplete resources over
long periods of time. This depletion can be seen in the decreasing sizes
of individual fish caught and in the decreasing amount of total catch.'0
Evidence from sites in the former Soviet Union shows a significant de-
cline in both the size of individual fish and the size of fish populations
over a 5000-year period." Evidence from other parts of Europe and the
Caribbean shows similar declines. 2
There are two well-known, mutually consistent hypotheses that may
explain why this trend of depletion and collapse of fisheries has not re-
sulted in a widespread recognition of the vulnerability of marine
resources. The first hypothesis is summed up in the concept of "shifting
baselines," that is, the fact that each new generation takes as its baseline
for comparison the abundance of marine wildlife its members experience
when they first observe the sea." Thus, members of the current genera-
tion do not understand how much larger and how much more abundant
8. David W. Sims & Alan J. Southward, Correspondence, Dwindling Fish Numbers
Already of Concern in 1883, 439 NATURE 660 (2006). Similar views persisted as recently as
1919. See id.
9. John E. Yellen et al., A Middle Stone Age Worked Bone Industry From Katanda,
Upper Semliki Valley, Zaire, 268 Sci. 553, 553 (1995).
10. Daniel Pauly et al., Toward Sustainability in World Fisheries, 418 NATURE 689, 689
(2002).
11. Tony J. Pitcher, Fisheries Managed to Rebuild Ecosystems? Reconstructing the Past
to Salvage the Future, 11 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 601, 603 (2001) (citing R.W. CASTEEL,
FISH REMAINS IN ARCHEOLOGY AND PALEO-ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES (1976)).
12. Id. (citation omitted); Arturo Morales et al., Cueva de Nerja (prov. Malaga): A
Close Look at a Twelve Thousand Year Ichthyofaunal Sequence From Southern Spain, in FISH
EXPLOITATION IN THE PAST: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 7TH MEETING OF THE ICAZ FISH REMAINS
WORKING GROUP 253 (Wim van Neer ed., 1994) (discussing the historical variance of fish
levels in Cueva de Nerja, Spain); Willemina Z. Wendrich & Wim van Neer, Preliminary Notes
on Fishing Gear and Fish at the Late Roan Fort at Abu Sha 'ar (Egyptian Red Sea Coast), in
FISH EXPLOITATION IN THE PAST, supra, at 183; Elizabeth S. Wing, Patterns of Prehistoric
Fishing in the West Indies, 3 ARCHAEOFAUNA 99 (1994).
13. Daniel Pauly, Postscript, Anecdotes and the Shifting Baseline Syndrome of Fisher-
ies, 10 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 430, 430 (1995); Mark Schrope, The Real Sea
Change, 443 NATURE 622, 622 (2006).
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marine wildlife used to be in their grandparents' time, let alone during
the lifetimes of their great-great-grandparents. 4 The second hypothesis is
that population collapse is actually the normal result of fishing, but that
historically when fishermen overfished a particular stock, they simply
moved on and fished for a new species or in a new location.'5 Archaeo-
logical evidence indeed shows shifts in catch species as initial target
species were depleted and fishermen moved on to others.' 6 Under this
hypothesis, as long as fishermen were able to shift to another species or
location, fishing enterprises could continue to operate and communities
could continue to consume seafood.
Modem technology, however, has dramatically increased the power
and the range of fishing enterprises. The nineteenth century brought
steam-powered vessels hauling in large trawl nets with power winches."
The twentieth century brought diesel engines, refrigeration technology,
radar, and fish-finding sonar.'" From the 1950s onward, industrial-scale
fishing has spread around the globe, leaving fish nowhere to hide. 9 Not
only do these industrial fishing gears catch enormous quantities of the
fish that are landed and brought to market, they also catch tremendous
quantities of non-marketable fish that are thrown back in the water, often
dead and dying.20 Some of these destructive industrial fishing gears, such
as bottom otter trawls, also plow across the seafloor destroying every-
thing in their path.2' These gears wipe out coral and sponge ecosystems,
replacing richly structured habitats with marine deserts.2
Over the last decade, marine scientists have conducted a number of
studies to try to put into perspective the damage that industrial fishing
practices are inflicting on the marine environment. One famous study
authored by the late Ransom Myers looked at population trends of large,
highly valued, and highly migratory fish such as tuna and swordfish over
14. Pauly, supra note 13, at 430.
15. Pauly et al., supra note 10, at 689.
16. Id. (citing Elizabeth S. Wing, The Sustainability of Resources Used by Native
Americans on Four Caribbean Islands, 11 INT'L J. OSTEOARCHAEOLOGY 112 (2001)).
17. Pauly et al., supra note 10, at 689.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also F. Berkes et al., Globalization, Roving Bandits, and Marine Resources,
311 Sci. 1557 (2006).
20. Jennie M. Harrington et al., Wasted Fishery Resources: Discarded By-Catch in the
USA, 6 FISH & FISHERIES 350, 351 (2005). They also incidentally catch and kill protected
marine mammals, such as dolphins, sea turtles, and sea birds. See Rebecca L. Lewison et al.,
Review, Understanding Impacts of Bycatch on Marine Megafauna, 19 TRENDS ECOLOGY &
EVOLUTION 598, 598 (2004).
21. Eric A. Bilsky, Conserving Marine Habitats, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 67,
67 (2006).
22. See, e.g., Eric A. Bilsky, International Cold-Water Coral Conservation: A Review, 3
A.B.A. INT'L ENVTL. L. COMMITTEE NEWSL. 8, 9-10 (2007) (discussing the destruction of the
oculina coral reef).
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the past one hundred years. 3 It showed that the population abundance of
these species had declined by ninety percent.24 Intense consumer demand
fed by industrial fishing has dramatically changed the marine ecosystem,
substantially removing these large predators from the food chain. A sec-
ond study looked at historical trends and projected them forward. 2' The
study found that, over time, fisheries tended to decline.26 Regardless of
their location, the wealth of their host State, or the nature of the State's
regulatory system, fisheries tended to run until fish stock were so de-
pleted that fishing was no longer commercially viable. The study then
looked at the rate of fisheries collapse and projected it into the future.
The study found that if current trends continued all existing commercial
fisheries would collapse by 2050.27 In other words, as projected, by 2050
there will be no recognizable wild-caught seafood in any market any-
where in the world.
II. THE PREVAILING SINGLE-SPECIES-BASED BIOLOGICAL APPROACH
TO FISHERIES MANAGEMENT DOES NOT WORK IN PRACTICE AND
DOES NOT COUNTERACT THE BASIC ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
TO OVERFISH
I argue below that conventional fisheries management is premised on
a single-species-based biological approach that does not work in prac-
tice. Over the years, the wealthiest, most developed countries in the
world have created regulatory systems intended to prevent the collapse
of fisheries and to allow for sustainable fishing within their jurisdictions.
But as a communication to World Trade Organization ("WTO") mem-
bers from Australia, New Zealand, and the United States observed,
"[w]hile management is a necessary element for sustainability, the re-
cord is painfully clear: even sophisticated management systems in
developed countries have failed in many cases to preserve stock sustain-
23. Ransom A. Myers & Boris Worm, Letter, Rapid Worldwide Depletion of Predatory
Fish Communities, 423 NATURE 280 (2003).
24. Id. at 282.
25. Boris Worm et al., Research Article, Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosys-
tem Services, 314 Sci. 787 (2006).
26. Id. at 788 ("Overall, historical trends led to the present depletion ... of 91[%]...
of species, on average... ); see also Ahmed S. Khan et al., The Nature and Magnitude of
Global Non-Fuel Fisheries Subsidies [hereinafter Non-Fuel Subsidies], in 14 FISHERIES CEN-
TRE RESEARCH REPORTS, CATCHING MORE BAIT: A BOrrOM-UP RE-ESTIMATION OF GLOBAL
FISHERIES SUBSIDIES 5, 5-6 (Ussif Rashid Sumaila & Daniel Pauly eds., 2006) [hereinafter
CATCHING MORE BAIT] ("[C]ompared to the 1950s, when most of the catches were taken from
undeveloped fisheries[]; the 1990s showed that most of the catches (about 75%) were from
fully exploited or overfished fisheries and over 10% from collapsed fisheries.") (figure omit-
ted).
27. Worm et al., supra note 25, at 790.
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ability, and management does not address the market- and trade-
distorting effects of subsidies. '
These management systems typically work as follows: Government
regulators rely on a biological single-species-based mathematical model,
which is unsuited for the need of conserving the entire marine ecosystem
and which requires more, and more accurate, data, than government reg-
ulators are willing or are able to collect. Government regulators use the
model, together with the inadequate data fed into it, to set a quota. But,
they invariably ignore the seemingly correct policy choice of maximum
economic yield in favor of the inappropriate biology-based maximum
sustainable yield.
Described in abstraction from the ecological and economic context
in which actual fisheries operate, biology-based single-species fisheries
management should work beautifully. The story starts with expert tech-
nocratic fishery managers systematically collecting information that
allows them to model fish populations and determine the biological
maximum rate of fishing that can be sustained each year.29 They then
translate that rate into a level of fishing to set an annual catch limit.30 The
fishing rate describes the intensity of the fishing effort, while the level
describes how many fish are caught. For example, if there are one hun-
dred fish in the water at the beginning of the year, and fishing enterprises
catch twenty of them, the average fishing rate during the year was 0.2.
The annual fishing level or yield was twenty fish. Thus, having deter-
mined the maximum sustainable fishing rate, the experts advise their
government of the level of fishing, or yield, which corresponds to that
rate. The government then issues regulations ensuring that no more fish
are caught than the maximum sustainable level.
The single-species biological approach, however, fails to take into
account important considerations of conserving ecosystems and eco-
nomic benefit. It also neglects to account for the difficulties of
implementing a data-intensive management system in an environment
where data are hard to obtain. Central to the argument of this Essay, the
biological approach fails to take into account the economic incentives
that lead to overcapacity and overfishing. The failures to work in practice
and to address the economic incentives are present at the international as
well as the national level.
28. Communication from Australia, New Zealand and the United States, Fisheries Sub-
sidies, TN/RLJW/235J 11 (July 18, 2008).
29. See, e.g., Donald Ludwig et al., Uncertainty, Resource Exploitation, and Conserva-
tion: Lessons From History, 260 Sci. 17, 17 (1993); Pauly et al., supra note 10, at 690 box 1.
30. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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A. Single-Species-Based Biological Fisheries Management
Fails to Take into Account Important Considerations of
Conserving Ecosystems and Economic Benefit
There are some significant mismatches between the abstract picture
underlying conventional fisheries management and reality. First, the sin-
gle-species approach to fisheries management fails to capture many
important environmental impacts. This Essay focuses on single-species
overfishing because existing fisheries management systems overwhelm-
ingly employ single-species models. Scientists and regulators are aware
that they should develop techniques for ecosystem management and ap-
ply them, but the awareness has not yet translated into action.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting briefly what issues might be addressed by
ecosystem-based management that are passed over by the single species
approach.
The single-species focus does not address the impact of fishing on
fish habitat and the indirect impact that destruction of fish habitat has on
the sustainable level of fishing.' The single-species focus also fails to
address the impact that incidental catch, or bycatch, has on species such
as sea turtles and sea birds that are not the target of the fishery.32 Neither
does this approach address the effects on other components of the eco-
system, which are affected by the removal of large numbers of fish that
non-human predators otherwise would eat.33
Second, the biological approach tries to maximize the amount of fish
it is biologically possible to catch sustainably, without adequately con-
sidering economic factors. The more fish that fishing vessels catch, the
more depleted the fish stock, and the more costly it is to catch the next
fish." For the typical fishery, the maximum sustainable economic bene-
fit, or maximum economic yield, is not at a yearly fish catch that is equal
to maximum sustainable (biological) yield, but at a lower catch where
less investment is needed to catch the last fish. 5 Nevertheless, biology-
31. Cf Paulyetal.,supranote 10, at 690-91.
32. Cf Harrington et al., supra note 20, at 357 ("[D]iscarding and bycatch is still a
major problem, likely to have considerable impacts on several marine ecosystems around the
country.").
33. See, e.g., Pauly et al., supra note 10, at 691.
34. But see Non-Fuel Subsidies, supra note 26, at 20 ("[Iun open access fisheries, in
which fishing cost is assumed to be proportional to fishing effort, effort will continue to in-
crease even though revenues per unit of effort are declining.").
35. Id.; see also SUNKEN BILLIONS, supra note 3, at 27-28; R.Q. Grafton et al., Eco-
nomics of Overexploitation Revisited, 318 Sci. 1601, 1601 (2007) ("[I]n practice BMEY >
BMSY."). In expressions such as "BMEY" and "BMSY" the "B" denotes biomass, the total
mass of fish in the population. Biomass is a common way of measuring the size of a fish
population. "BMEY" denotes the biomass that would allow the taking of the maximum (sus-
tainable) economic yield, while "BMSY" denotes the biomass that would allow the taking of
the maximum sustainable (biological) yield.
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oriented regulators typically do not try to identify the maximum eco-
nomic yield and do not try to attain it. Instead, they focus on the less
economically beneficial maximum sustainable (biological) yield.36
B. The Biological Approach Also Fails to Take into Account the
Difficulties of Implementing a Data-Intensive Management System
in an Environment Where Data Are Hard to Obtain
The biological approach to management also falls short because the
data necessary for applying the approach are frequently not collected and
the results of modeling can fluctuate dramatically from year to year.
Collecting data on fish populations is expensive and difficult. For
example, even though wealthy countries like the United States have ex-
tensive data on certain commercially fished species, in 2007, out of the
528 stocks and stock complexes caught in U.S. fisheries, fishery manag-
ers failed to collect sufficient data for 338 stocks and stock complexes to
determine whether they were overfished.37 Thus even in a wealthy and
relatively well-functioning system, there were insufficient data for sixty-
four percent of the stocks and stock complexes.
In addition, the modeling process is not as simple and straightfor-
ward as the abstract picture would have it. In 2001, for example, the
National Marine Fisheries Service assessed the health of darkblotched
rockfish, one of the species in the commercial Pacific groundfish fishery,
at a depleted twenty-two percent of its unfished biomass. 38 The very next
year the agency's assessment said the situation was twice as bad and that
darkblotched rockfish were actually at only twelve percent of the un-
fished population level, a very, very low population level. In contrast, the
population level typically associated with maximum sustainable yield is
about forty percent of unfished biomass .
In a similar example of an estimate fluctuating wildly in a short pe-
riod of time, in 2008 the Fisheries Service re-estimated the stock size
consistent with maximum sustainable yield for Georges Bank stock of
cod, one of the most heavily studied fish populations on the planet, re-
ducing it from the 2002 estimate of 217,000 metric tons to 148,084
36. Ludwig et al., supra note 29, at 17; Pauly et al., supra note 10, at 689.
37. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS: THE STATUS OF
U.S. FISHERIES 4 (2008).
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metric tons.40 This meant that if the current estimate were correct, the old
estimate was too high by a factor of one and a half.
C. The Biological Approach Fails to Counteract the Economic Incentives
that Lead to Unsustainable Fishing
Central to the argument of this Essay, the biological approach to
fisheries management does not counteract the perverse economic incen-
tives that arise from the tragedy of the commons. These incentives lead
to pressure for overfishing, which results in managers setting inappropri-
ate quotas and/or failing to enforce the quotas that they set.
1. The Biological Approach Does Not Counteract the Perverse
Economic Incentives that Arise from the Tragedy of the Commons
The biological approach does not address the perverse economic in-
centives created by allowing fishing enterprises to exploit a public
resource. In the typical fishery, the fishing enterprises do not own rights
to the resource. So, for any given fishing year, the fishing enterprises
compete without regard to their expectation for the following year be-
cause they have no property right to future catches. These economic
incentives tend to create overcapacity even in what are traditionally re-
garded as well-managed fisheries and even without the additional
perverse incentive supplied by overfishing subsidies.
The simplest case is the "open-access" fishery in which all fishing
enterprises have the right to attempt to catch fish, but no fishing enter-
prise has a right to a specific share of the catch in the current or future
years. This open-access case is an example of the Tragedy of the Com-
mons, in which a shared resource is overexploited to the collective
detriment of all the resource users. More and more fishing enterprises
will catch fish, until fish become so scarce and costly to catch that any
further catch would cause economic losses.2 In the typical fishery, the
resulting long-term average yield would be significantly lower than the
maximum sustainable (biological) yield, with a fish population size sig-
nificantly smaller than that necessary to support either maximum
sustainable or maximum economic yields.43 Thus, economic theory tells
us that an open-access fishery results in additional fishing enterprises
entering the fishery to capture the benefits until the fishery reaches an
40. NORTHEAST FISHERIES SCI. CTR., ASSESSMENT OF 19 NORTHEAST GROUNDFISH
STOCK THROUGH 2007: REPORT OF THE 3RD GROUNDFISH ASSESSMENT REVIEW MEETING 2-
5, 2-13 (2008) [hereinafter NORTHEAST GROUNDFISH STOCK].
41. SUNKEN BILLIONS, supra note 3, at 28.
42. Non-Fuel Subsidies, supra note 26, at 14 (citing H. Scott Gordon, The Economic




equilibrium, known as the bionomic equilibrium, in which no fishing
enterprise derives any economic rent.44 The tragedy of the commons
leads to overcapacity which leads to overfishing.
Typically, government regulators try to ensure that the fishery is sus-
tainable and that yields are higher by imposing a quota (or "total
allowable catch") set at maximum sustainable yield.4 5 "[A]s long as the
limit is set to achieve a sustainable yield, and regulations are perfectly
enforced," this system will stop single species overfishing. '6 "However, if
the catch controls are not perfectly enforced, then the effects will tend to
be similar to those of an unrestricted (or open access) system." 47 The
level of effort required to catch the maximum sustainable yield is gener-
ally less than the level of effort that fishermen would normally expend in
an unregulated open access fishery as they compete to catch fish. But
since there are no property rights in the resource, the quota applies to the
entire fleet, and it is up to the fishing enterprises to compete against each
other to determine who will catch what share of that quota.48 Fishing en-
terprises in this system have an incentive to invest in more powerful
vessels and equipment to outcompete each other for catch under the quo-
ta.49 Therefore, as with the completely unregulated case, the open access
fishery with quotas creates overcapacity. The oversized fleet creates tre-
mendous political pressure for regulators to increase quota levels in
order to accommodate fishing interests. 0 Thus, simply imposing a fleet-
wide quota fails to counteract fully the economic incentives to overfish
and overinvest.
Another typical regulatory technique is to restrict access to a limited
number of fishing enterprises that are given permits. If these permits are
restricted to enterprises currently participating in the fishery, limiting
access will combat overcapacity caused by new entrants. Nonetheless, if
the quota remains fleet-wide, the fishing enterprises with permits will
still have an incentive to invest in more powerful vessels and equipment
44. Id. at 14; see also J.M. Ward et al., Measuring and Assessing Capacity in Fisheries,
at 25-29, app. A (Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., Fisheries Technical Paper No. 433/1, 2004)
(discussing capacity management programs).
45. See J.R. Beddington et al., Current Problems in the Management of Marine Fisher-
ies, 316 Sc. 1713, 1713-14 (2007).
46. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Subsidies: A Way Towards Sustainable
Fisheries?, POL'Y BREF, Dec. 2005, at 1, 3 [hereinafter OECD].
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Christopher Costello et al., Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Col-
lapse?, 321 Sci. 1678, 1679 (2008).
49. See, e.g., Ray Hilborn, Managing Fisheries Is Managing People: What Has Been
Learned?, 8 FISH & FISHERIEs 285, 288 (2007) ("[Tlhe largest and fastest boats caught the
most fish.").
50. See id. (describing the overexpansion of the U.S. and Canadian fleets in the 1980s).
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and the regulatory regime will still lead to excess capacity that will cause
overfishing.
One well-known solution to changing the economic pressures on
sustainability is to give or sell fishing enterprises property rights in the
resource." The theory is that such property rights will prevent the over-
investment in fishing equipment needed to outcompete other fishing
enterprises for a share of the global quota, because each fishing enter-
prise will have its own share guaranteed and "the catch cannot be
increased by increasing catching power." 2 Furthermore, because fishing
enterprises will have property interests in the present and future years'
catches, their self-interest will lead them to maximize the long-term in-
come stream by fishing sustainably 3 While such individual fishing
quotas or catch shares hold the promise of solving many fishing regula-
tion problems, they are not perfect. For example, catch shares do not
eliminate the incentive to overfish caused by the government subsidies
that are the focus of this Essay.
So without rights in the resource and/or other similarly effective ef-
forts to constrain fishing, we end up with fewer fish in the water, fewer
fish in the market, and greater costs involved in catching those fish we
do land. 4 The flip side of this situation is that a reduction in fishing ef-
fort can rapidly increase productivity, profitability, and net economic
benefits from a fishery. Stock rebuilding will increase sustainable yields
and lower fishing costs, providing significant economic gains.5
2. Perverse Economic Incentives Lead to Inappropriate Quotas
and Lack of Enforcement
The economic incentives created by lack of ownership in the re-
source and overinvestment in capacity push fishing enterprises to seek
both covert and overt political relief from the constraint of the maximum
sustainable yield quota. The economic incentives drive fishing enter-
prises to seek the ability to fish at the full level that they would if there
were no quota at all.56 Two pressure relief valves enable fishing enter-
prises to catch more fish than the regulatory system should allow: quota
setting and quota enforcement.
51. Costello et al., supra note 48, at 1679.
52. Hilbom, supra note 49, at 289.
53. Costello et al., supra note 48, at 1680 (asserting that conversion to a catch shares
regulatory system stops the decline of a fishery); Beddington, supra note 45, at 1714.
54. SUNKEN BILLIONS, supra note 3, at 39 ("[I]n general, the more clearly defined and
enforceable the rights, the less the benefit loss." (citation omitted)).
55. Id. at xv.
56. Cf. Ludwig et al., supra note 29, at 17 ("Wealth or the prospect of wealth generates
political and social power that is used to promote unlimited exploitation of resources.").
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An example from the U.S. portion of the Gulf of Mexico shows what
can happen to quota-setting under political pressure. Fisheries Service
scientists recommended that the quota for overfished king mackerel be
set at five million pounds for the 1992-93 fishing season, and in no event
higher than 6.1 million pounds.57 Accordingly, the Gulf of Mexico Fish-
ery Management Council's Mackerel Management Committee took the
high end of the recommendation and advised the full Council to adopt a
6.1 million pound quota. 8 It was politically infeasible for the Council to
implement the quota, because doing so would have required reducing the
bag limit (the number of fish per person per trip) for politically powerful
recreational fishers from three to one.5 9 Recognizing this political prob-
lem, the Council adopted a quota that was over a million pounds higher
than the scientists recommended, ensuring recreational fishers a two-bag
limit.60 The quota allocated 5.3 million pounds of catch to the recrea-
tional fishers and an additional 2.5 million pounds to commercial fishing
enterprises. 6' But the management system was not even effective at hold-
ing fishermen to that quota, because the regulation relied on an indirect
management measure for recreational fishers. This consisted of a bag
limit on the number of fish that could be retained per trip, rather than an
absolute limit that would require closure of the fishery once the limit
was reached. The catch for the recreational fishermen alone ended up at
6.2 million pounds.62
The king mackerel story is not an isolated event. In fact, federal fish-
eries regulators in the United States are frequently pressured to increase
quotas over the level recommended by scientists. Starting in 1976, the
law governing federal fisheries, now known as the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, required that fishing levels
63not exceed maximum sustainable yield except in special circumstances
and that fisheries managers develop regulations based on the best avail-
able science.64 The special circumstances exception was notoriously
57. JOSH EAGLE ET AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT
COUNCILS 22 box 7 (2003).
58. Id. at 22.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 22 box 7.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, §§ 3(18),
301(a)(1), 90 Stat. 331, 335, 346 (1976) (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882
(2004)) (defining "optimum" and requiring fisheries to achieve optimum yield).
64. Id. § 301(a)(2).
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abused, leading to chronic overfishing and the collapse of the New Eng-
land cod and haddock fisheries.65
In response, Congress removed the special circumstances exception
in 1996, seemingly requiring that maximum sustainable yield never be
exceeded.6 Shortly thereafter, however, in the famous fisheries case Na-
tional Resources Defense Council v. Daley,67 the government adopted a
suite of regulatory measures it claimed complied with the maximum sus-
tainable yield requirement because it had an eighteen percent likelihood
of limiting the fishing rate to the rate that scientists recommended.68 The
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia accepted the govern-
ment's position, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
overturned the District Court, finding that "[o]nly in Superman Comics'
Bizarro world, where reality is turned upside down, could the Service
reasonably conclude that a measure that is at least four times as likely to
fail as to succeed" complies with the requirement not to exceed maxi-
mum sustainable yield. 69 Nevertheless, the government has advanced,
and some courts have accepted, a tortured statutory interpretation that
allows fishing at a rate higher than that consistent with maximum sus-
tainable yield even when the fish population has declined to the point
that it is governed by special rules designed to rebuild it to healthy lev-
els.7°
Fisheries managers also frequently use lax enforcement as a safety
valve to reduce the pressure of fishing enterprises seeking higher rates of
fishing than would be permitted by the maximum sustainable yield sys-
65. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 23,934, 23,935 (1996) (statement of Sen. Chafee) ("A
look at some of the consequences of fisheries mismanagement in New England is staggering
.... ").
66. See Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, § 102, 110 Stat. 3559, 3562
(1996) (altering definition of "optimum" to replace ability to "modify" yield from maximum
sustainable yield with ability only to "reduce" yield); 142 CONG. REC. 23,681, 23,707 (1996)
(statement of Sen. Hollings) ("The bill ... caps fishery harvests at the maximum sustainable
levels ... ").
67. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 754.
70. On its face, the Magnuson-Stevens Act appears to prohibit overfishing across the
board. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1884, § 1851(a)(1) (2006) ("Conservation and management meas-
ure shall prevent overfishing ...."). However, the government seized on language from
another provision of the statute concerning what to do when a population of fish is depleted
and must be rebuilt to a healthy level. Id. § 1854(e). This rebuilding provision allows the gov-
ernment to set forth a plan to increase the population size over a period of years. Id.
§ 1854(e)(2). The government has argued, and some courts have agreed, that this remedial
provision of the statute aimed at recovering the most unhealthy fish populations actually al-
lows for fishing at unsustainable levels, notwithstanding the Act's general prohibition on
overfishing, so long as the plan provides that the population will be rebuilt by the plan's end
date. Oceana, Inc. v. Evans, No. 04-0811, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3959, at *15, *54 (D.D.C.
Mar. 9, 2005) ("[Olverfishing need not be immediately terminated.").
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tern. For example, following the 1995 collapse of a number of New Eng-
land groundfish fisheries, Congress passed amendments to the
Magnuson-Stevens Act requiring that fisheries managers rebuild col-
lapsed fisheries and imposing significantly lower catch quotas.7 ' New
England fishery managers relieved the resulting pressure on the industry
by calling the quotas "target[s]," and by failing to enforce them.72 Over a
period of years, fishing enterprises exceeded the quotas regularly and
substantially, frequently by a factor of two or higher. 3 This practice cre-
ated a self-reinforcing process in which fish populations continued at
depressed levels, resulting in economically difficult quotas and substan-
tial quota exceedances, which continued to depress fish populations.74
Conservation groups challenged the non-enforcement of quotas but,
notwithstanding evidence presented of exceedances over a period of sev-
eral years, the court deferred to the Fisheries Service's contention that its
current fishery management proposals were different from the failed
proposals of prior years."
The situation, especially in New England, became so frustrating for
conservation groups and legislators that, in 2006, Congress amended the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, restating explicitly and in other words what the
statute appeared to say already: that by using the best available science,
Congress meant that the government should follow scientists' recom-
mendations in setting limits on fishing, 6 that overfishing should be
prevented by setting annual catch limits, 77 and that annual catch limits
should actually be enforced by measures that "ensure accountability."78
71. See, e.g., Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2001)
(contesting initial refusal of agency to implement the required lower quotas).
72. Catharine A. Latanich, Hard Catch Limits in the Northeast Multispecies Fishery:
Balancing Accountability and Opportunity in a Multispecies Complex 3 (May 2007) (unpub-
lished M.E.M. project, Duke University), available at http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/
dspace/bitstream/10l6l/292/1/MPcal7_a_052007.pdf (last visited June 14, 2009).
73. SARAH CLARK STUART, SHELL GAME: HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS HIDING
THE MISMANAGEMENT OF OUR NATION'S FISHERIES 17 fig. 11 (2006).
74. Id. at 17-18.
75. Oceana, Inc. v. Evans, No. 04-0811, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3959, at **60-62.
Notwithstanding the court's deference to the agency, the agency's most recent stock assess-
ment, taken in 2007, reports that thirteen of the nineteen groundfish stocks were overfished.
NORTHEAST GROUNDFISH STOCK, supra note 40, at xiv (finding that the fishing rate exceeded
FMSY).
76. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of
2006, Pub. L. 109-479, §§ 103, 302(h), 120 Stat. 3575, 3581 (2007) (amending 16 U.S.C.
§ 1852(h) to require regional councils to follow scientific recommendations).
77. Id. § 104(a) (adding new sections 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(15), 120 Stat. 3584).
78. Id.
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D. International Fisheries Regulation Suffers from the Same Defects
as National Regulation
International fisheries regulation is based on the same single-species
based biological approach that is used within most national jurisdictions.
Accordingly, the problems that plague national fisheries are also preva-
lent at the international level.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("Law of the
Sea") gives each coastal State jurisdiction over fishery resources within
an exclusive economic zone ("EEZ"), which in most cases extends 200
miles from the State's shore. 9 In the past, approximately ninety percent
of commercial fishing took place within EEZs; however, as near-shore
fisheries become more and more depleted, fishing is pushing further out
and expanding into the high seas. 0 The Law of the Sea formulates gen-
eral conservation duties that are quite similar to the duties in U.S. law:
fish populations must be maintained at a level consistent with maximum
sustainable yield, taking into account various other factors, and coastal
States must establish permissible catch levels for each fish species'
stock." As explained above, while these general conservation require-
ments look good on paper, they are inadequate to constrain fishing to
sustainable levels.82
The Law of the Sea also covers fishing on what are known as "strad-
dling stocks," those whose range crosses one or more EEZs, as well as
stocks of highly migratory species such as tuna and swordfish that range
across the high seas. The Law of the Sea is applied in this area through
the later-negotiated Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions
of the Convention Relating to Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migra-
tory Species ("Straddling Stocks Agreement").83 The Agreement is
implemented for straddling stocks whose range crosses EEZs through
agreements among neighboring coastal States, usually through bilateral
treaties, commissions, or regional fishery management organizations.8
On the high seas, the Straddling Stocks Agreement is implemented
through existing or newly created regional fishery management organi-
79. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 55, 56(1), 57, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
80. ROBIN ROLF CHURCHILL & ALAN VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 288 (3d
ed. 1999).
81. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 79, art. 61.
82. See supra Part I.
83. United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, July 24-Aug. 4, 1995, Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Con-.
servation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N.
Doc A/CONF 164/37 (Sept. 8, 1995) [hereinafter Straddling Stocks Agreement].
84. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 80, at 294-96.
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zations." A regional fishery management organization is simply an or-
ganization set up by international agreement among a group of States
that establishes absolute fishing levels for straddling stocks and allocates
catch under those levels to the Member States.
The Straddling Stocks Agreement represents a significant advance
because it requires a State wishing to fish on the high seas to comply
with the regulations of the regional fishery management organization in
charge of the targeted fish stock.86 It also requires States to set up new
regional fishery management organizations where no such organizations
already exist." The Straddling Stocks Agreement also marks an impor-
tant advance in international fisheries law, in that is sets out for the first
time, and in great detail, standards requiring that States use a precaution-
ary approach in order to conserve marine resources and ensure their
long-term sustainability The Agreement has been widely accepted;
currently there are seventy-one parties to it. 9 There are thirty regional
fishery management organizations in the world today. Two of them were
established explicitly to implement the Straddling Stocks Agreement in
areas where no regional fishery management organization had previously
existed.90
Nevertheless, the Straddling Stocks Agreement is still committed to
the basic single-species biological approach that has traditionally
failed.9' The reluctance of fishing enterprises to constrain their catch lev-
els and fishing capacities at the national level is simply duplicated in the
regional fishery management organizations. For example, in 1998, the
regional fishery management organization governing the catch of west
Atlantic bluefin tuna, one of the most heavily-studied fish populations,
was faced with the unpleasant news that the population was far below its
target size, and that a quota of zero was necessary to rebuild to the target
size within twenty years. 92 Rather than face up to this problem, the
85. Id. at 309.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; Straddling Stocks Agreement, supra note 83, art 6.
89. United Nations, Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Succes-
sions to the Convention and the Related Agreements as at 04 May 2009 [sic],
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/chronological-lists-ofratifications.htm#Agreem
ent%20relating%20to%20the%20implementation%20of%2OPart%20XI%20of%20the%20Co
nvention (last visited June 14, 2009).
90. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Fisheries and
Aquaculture Department, Strengthening Regional Fisheries Governance, http://www.fao.org/
fishery/topic/14908/en.
91. Straddling Stocks Agreement, supra note 83, art. 5(b) (stating maximum sustain-
able yield goal).
92. Carl Safina & Dane H. Klinger, Collapse of Bluefin Tuna in the Western Atlantic, 22
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 243, 243 (2008).
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fishing industry supplied a scientist who developed a new model that
actually allowed the quota to be increased. 93 The fishery managers ac-
cepted the results of this model and increased the quota.94 As the
example illustrates, just as with domestic single-species biology-based
management systems, the international system has not succeeded in es-
tablishing sustainable fisheries.
III. GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES ARE A MAJOR ENABLER OF
OVERFISHING
I have argued that typical regulatory systems are inadequate to con-
serve resources and maximize economic benefits, and that economic
incentives undermine the regulatory process. Government subsidies for
fishing enterprises make the creation of excess fishing capacity and the
resultant overfishing even more likely.
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
("SCM"), the currently effective international agreement generally regu-
lating government subsidies, defines "subsidy" to mean a financial
contribution in which a government (1) directly provides funds, goods,
or services, foregoes income due (except monies for general infrastruc-
ture),9 or indirectly provides such a contribution by channeling it
93. Id. at 243-44. The new model assumed that the dramatic decline in recent years of
the west Atlantic bluefin tuna population was caused not by overfishing, but by some unidenti-
fied change in the environment. Id. Accordingly, the model declined to consider data gathered
in the 1970s and before, when the population was higher. Id. The perverse result was that the
model concluded that the size of the current population relative to the biomass consistent with
maximum sustainable yield was much larger than the relative size found by the old model that
considered all the data. Id. Because the new model assessed the population as relatively
healthier, it allowed relatively higher rates of fishing. Litigation in which I participated chal-
lenged the use of the new model, but was not successful. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Evans,
No. 99-1707, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23675 (D.D.C. July 3, 2003). The most recent stock
assessment found that fishing levels based on this new model, which was supposed to gradu-
ally increase the size of the population, have instead resulted in a further seven percent
decline. Victor R. Restrepo, Int'l Comm'n for the Conservation Atlantic Tunas [ICCAT], On
the Possible Current Status of the Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Stock Had the Main Fisheries
Caught Their 2003-2007 Quota, at 1, ICCAT Rep. SCRS/2008/175 (2008). A study accompa-
nying the stock assessment found that, had countries been able to catch their full quotas,
something they had not been able to do because of the scarcity of the tuna, the population
would have fallen thirty-one percent from the 1999 level. Id. at 2.
94. Safina & Klinger, supra note 92, at 244.
95. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Annex IA,
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1.1, Apr. 15, 1994, as reprinted in
THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGO-
TIATIONS 231, 231 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (1994) [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. The
"general infrastructure exception," id. art. 1.1(a)(I)(iii), removes from the definition many
government goods and services that benefit fishing enterprises, such as the judicial system,
law enforcement, coast guard, roads, and so forth. Some or all of these general infrastructure
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through a private body; and, (2) the government thereby confers a bene-
fit.96 This broad definition includes many things that confer benefits on
fishing enterprises, including direct financial contributions for new ves-
sels, new equipment, and operating expenses (such as costs of fuel, ice,
and bait). This definition of "subsidies" also includes the transfer from
the government to private fishing enterprises of rights that the govern-
ment has purchased to fish in foreign waters. Finally, subsidies might
also include granting fishing enterprises access to fishery resources
without an appropriate charge. 97
Such government financial contributions can have a serious impact
on the sustainability of fisheries. As explained above, in an open-access
fishery, the fishery reaches an equilibrium in which all economic rent is
dissipated.9" At this equilibrium, there is a long-term average yield lower
than the maximum sustainable (biological) yield and the stock size is
lower than the stock size consistent with maximum sustainable yield.
Government subsidies counter the economic incentive to stop fishing
even at this equilibrium. The subsidies lower the costs faced by the fish-
ing enterprises, allowing them to fish beyond the bionomic equilibrium,
making the level of overfishing even more severe and the size of fish
stocks even smaller. Government subsidies will also tend to undermine
more sophisticated regulatory systems. Even where regulators set quotas
or limit access, there is an incentive to increase capacity beyond sustain-
able levels because the quota applies to an entire fleet, so that individual
enterprises continue to have an incentive to invest in outcompeting each
other. By reducing the cost of fishing, subsidies create greater pressure to
increase capacity. Even in an individual fishing quota system, govern-
ment subsidies decrease fishing costs and therefore increase the profits
of individual fishing enterprises from the same stock size. Thus subsidies
reduce the incentive to increase stock sizes to the maximum sustainable
or the maximum economic yield level.
Governments administer subsidies to fishing enterprises around the
world at an astonishing rate. The most comprehensive recent study of
subsidies are justified because these services create "positive externalities and public goods
which are not internalized in market prices." See MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 334 (2d ed. 2006).
96. SCM Agreement, supra note 95, art. 1.1; MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 95, at
336.
97. See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 95, at 339-40 (discussing Panel Report, Unit-
ed-States-Preliminary Determinations With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber From
Canada, §§ 7.14, 7.23, 7.28-30, WT/DS236/R (Sept. 27, 2002) ("Canadian provincial stump-
age programmes involve the provision by the government of standing timber, and, as such, the
provision of a good in the sense of Article 1. 1 (a)(1)(iii) SCM Agreement.")) (citation omitted);
cf Marc Benitah, Five Suggestions for Clarifying the Draft Text on Fisheries Subsidies, 12
BRIDGES 21 (Feb. 2008), available at http://ictsd.net/downloads/2009/03/bridges 12- I.pdf.
98. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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these subsidies concluded that from 1995 through 2005, governments
worldwide dispersed between $30 billion and $34 billion in subsidies to
the fishing industry." Of these, non-fuel subsidies accounted for $26 bil-
lion and fuel subsidies accounted for between $4 billion and $8 billion.'m
Approximately $6.6 billion of these non-fuel subsidies went to areas like
research and fisheries regulation, which arguably have benefited the en-
vironment and the economy. Another $3.4 billion went to subsidies such
as fisher assistance programs, which might not have had an adverse envi-
ronmental impact, if implemented correctly.'' The remaining $20 to $24
billion, however, directly funded new equipment purchases, boat build-
ing expenses, and lowered fuel costs,'re all of which either reduced
fishery operating costs or increased their revenues. As a result, there has
been even more fishing effort and even greater depletion of marine re-
sources.' °3 In fact, in large part because of these subsidies, global fishing
fleets possess more than twice the capacity to catch fish than the oceans
can sustainably support. '04
The high seas bottom-trawling fishery provides a good example of
the effect of these subsidies. High seas bottom trawlers steam long dis-
tances into deep international waters and drop their nets onto the tops
and slopes of underwater mountains, or seamounts, that host especially
rich underwater ecosystems.' 5 The huge nets destroy the rich coral and
sponge structures that provide a physical habitat for species at the base
of the ecosystem and they sweep up deep-sea fish species at rates far too
high to be sustainable.'O° As fishing in deep water and far from port
should be very expensive, it is fair to wonder how fishing enterprises can
make it profitable. It turns out that the profit from the high seas bottom-
trawling fleet accounts for no more than ten percent of the landed value
of the fish.' °7 Yet, the fleet receives subsidies equivalent to twenty-five
99. Daniel Pauly, Director's Foreword to CATCHING MORE BAIT, supra note 26, at 1, 1.
100. Ussif Rashid Sumaila & Daniel Pauly, Executive Summary to CATCHING MORE
BAIT, supra note 26, at 2, 2 [hereinafter Executive Summary].
101. Non-Fuel Subsidies, supra note 26, at 22, 25.
102. Id. at 23; Ussif Rashid Sumaila et al., Fuel Subsidies to Global Fisheries: Magni-
tude and Impacts on Resource Sustainability, in CATCHING MORE BAIT, supra note 26, at 38,
46 [hereinafter Fuel Subsidies to Global Fisheries].
103. Executive Summary, supra note 100, at 2.
104. Non-Fuel Subsidies, supra note 26, at 8; see also SUNKEN BILLIONS, supra note 3,
at xviii ("This study and previous studies indicate that the current marine catch could be
achieved with approximately half of the current global fishing effort.").
105. See, e.g., J. A. Koslow et al., Seamount Benthic Macrofauna off Southern Tasmania:
Community Structure and Impacts of Trawling, 213 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 111,
112(2001).
106. Id. at 122-23.
107. Ussif Rashid Sumaila et al., Subsidies to High Seas Bottom Trawl Fleets and the
Sustainability of Deep Sea Benthic Stocks, in CATCHING MORE BAIT, supra note 26, at 49, 51.
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percent of the landed value of the fish."8 Consequently, this environmen-
tally disastrous form of fishing is solely a creation of government
subsidies and, in many cases, would cease to exist if the subsidies were
withdrawn. '9
Perhaps the most significant and damaging subsidies are fuel subsi-
dies. Fuel subsidies go directly to reducing fishery operating costs,
which directly results in an inappropriate increase in fishing activity.
Even before prices started to rise, fuel accounted for between ten and
twenty-five percent (on average)" ° and up to sixty percent (in some
cases) of some fisheries' costs."' Fuel prices and fuel subsidies are par-
ticularly important to some of the most environmentally damaging
fisheries. For example, aided by reduced fuel prices, longline fishing
vessels are able to travel long distances across the high seas in search of
valuable migratory species like swordfish and tuna."2 As a result, many
of these species have been significantly depleted."3 Moreover, these
longline vessels catch and kill large numbers of non-target species, in-
cluding sharks, sea turtles, and marine mammals, ' 4 causing many of
these species to be significantly depleted."5 But, longline fishing is such
an economically marginal enterprise 6 that longline vessels might not be
able to continue such extensive high sea fishing if they were required to
bear their own costs rather than benefiting from government subsidies.
Government subsidies further allow developed countries to overex-
ploit and deplete the resources of undeveloped countries. "' As European
countries, in particular, depleted the fishery resources near to their
coasts, they executed agreements with West African countries to access
African fishery resources."' This access was bolstered by government
subsidies in the form of transferred access rights from the African na-
tions to European fishing enterprises, as well as by existing subsidies for
108. Id.
109. Id. at 49.
110. SUNKEN BILLIONS, supra note 3, at 15.
111. Fuel Subsidies to Global Fisheries, supra note 102, at 38.
112. See, e.g., LARRY B. CROWDER & RANSOM A. MYERS, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT TO
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THE ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF THE
WORLDWIDE PELAGIC LONGLINE INDUSTRY 2 (2001); Myers & Worm, supra note 23, at 280,
282.
113. CROWDER & MYERS, supra note 112, at 29, 34; Myers & Worm, supra note 23, at
282.
114. CROWDER & MYERS, supra note 112, at 2.
115. Id. at40, 73, 78.
116. See, e.g., id. at 14 ("[Mlany longline firms are under financial stress and are cur-
rently operating at the margin.").
117. Non-Fuel Subsidies, supra note 26, at 24.
118. Jacqueline Alder & Ussif Rashid Sumaila, Western Africa: A Fish Basket of Europe
Past and Present, 13 J. ENV'T & DEV. 156, 172 (2004); Justin S. Brashares et al., Bushmeat
Hunting, Wildlife Declines, and Fish Supply in West Africa, 306 SCI. 1180, 1182 (2004).
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fuel, fishing vessels, and/or the equipment.' 9 These access agreements
have resulted in unsustainable fishing that has depleted fishing resources
that the inhabitants of coastal African countries rely on for subsistence or
for their own commercial fishing needs.'20 This disruption, in turn, has
led to other ecological and economic dislocation, including increased
reliance on bush meat for food, depletion of the terrestrial wild animal
populations, and emigration from countries whose environment can no
longer support economically viable communities. 2 '
Subsidies can also have inappropriate distributional effects. While in
developing countries, small-scale fishing enterprises can sometimes fish
more efficiently and sustainably than large, industrial enterprises,'2 2 fre-
quently large, inefficient, and unsustainable fishing enterprises have the
ear of the government and therefore receive a disproportionate share of
subsidies.2 3 As a result, these inefficient and unsustainable enterprises
can outcompete smaller enterprises whose success would be more bene-
ficial to the nation and the environment.124
Overfishing subsidies also may reduce the flexibility and resilience
of communities. 125 Subsidies create the expectation of and reliance on
government support. 26 If there were no subsidies, when fuel prices rose,
fishing enterprises would seek more fuel-efficient ways of catching fish
and/or their participants would seek out more profitable businesses.
Similarly, without subsidies, when fish became so scarce through over-
fishing that it was no longer profitable to catch them, fishery participants
would look for other kinds of seafood to catch and/or opportunities in
other businesses. But the availability of subsidies through the exertion of
political pressure allows fishery participants to stay locked into environ-
mentally harmful and economically senseless business practices. In some
cases, the availability of subsidies may prevent a transition to a more
rational local economy, leaving a community clinging on in poverty to a
moribund fishery supported by meager subsidies. Such may be the case
in Newfoundland, whose cod fishery collapsed in the late 1980s, but
119. Brashares et al, supra note 118, at 1182; Fuel Subsidies to Global Fisheries, supra
note 102, at 45, 47; Non-Fuel Subsidies, supra note 26, at 23-24.
120. Alder & Sumaila, supra note 118, at 168-69; Brashares et al., supra note 118, at
1182.
121. Brashares et al., supra note 118, at 1182; Sharon LaFraniere, Europe Takes Africa's
Fish, and Boatloads of Migrants Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2008, at Al.
122. Jennifer Jacquet & Daniel Pauly, Funding Priorities: Big Barriers to Small-Scale
Fisheries, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 832, 832 (2008).
123. See id. at 833.
124. Id.




whose fishermen to this day receive subsidies that may allow them to
stay in an economically dead fishing industry. 
27
IV. GOVERNMENTS AND CONSERVATION ADVOCATES SEEK TO USE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION TO PROHIBIT OVERFISHING
SUBSIDIES AND PROMOTE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY
Global transboundary problems demand global transboundary an-
swers. While some major developed countries such as the United States
have reduced capacity-building subsidies after it became clear that these
countries had excess fishing capacity, other developed and developing
countries have not shown such restraint. Subsidies in one country harm
people and enterprises in other countries in several ways. Such subsidies
lead to unsustainable fishing practices that harm the environment both in
the subsidizing country's jurisdiction and in the international waters that
the country's fleet fishes.' 28 The subsidies also deplete shared fish popu-
lations, whose habitat range crosses borders, and harm highly migratory
fish species, which are targeted by fishing fleets from many nations.
Like subsidies for agriculture or manufacturing, subsidies for fishing
may also have adverse consequences for trade. Recall that eighty percent
of the seafood sold in the United States comes from foreign countries.
International competition from subsidized sources helps foreign enter-
prises outcompete non-subsidized domestic enterprises for domestic
sales. It is equally true that foreign subsidies put enterprises trying to
export into the subsidizing market at a disadvantage. Finally, even eco-
nomically inefficient subsidized enterprises may be able, with the benefit
of a subsidy, to outcompete and displace economically more efficient
and sustainable enterprises. For all of these reasons, while it is important
for major countries to show leadership in renouncing overfishing subsi-
dies, international agreement is essential to limiting subsidies and
helping to reverse the global trend of collapsing fisheries.
Consequently, the WTO is a natural forum in which to attempt to
solve the fisheries subsidies problem. The WTO carries out multiple
functions, such as providing forums for dispute resolution and negotia-
tion of future agreements. 129 Thus the WTO offers a ready-made
negotiating process through which to address the issue of overfishing
127. Cf Lawrence C. Hamilton & Melissa J. Butler, Outport Adaptations: Social Indica-
tors Through Newfoundland's Cod Crisis, 8 HUM. ECOLOGY REv. 1, 7 (2001)
("[Unemployment insurance] has been part of the fabric of modem outport life, with many
people seeking work for the minimal 11-week periods required to qualify for benefits.").
128. See supra Part II.
129. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 95, at 9.
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subsidies. Moreover, because most nations are WTO members'30 (and the
only major fishing power that is not, Russia, is seeking membership),'3 ' a
WTO agreement would have the global reach that is necessary to address
the problem. The WTO has a continuing mission to remove barriers to
trade, and in keeping with that mission, its members engage in succes-
sive rounds of negotiations to take the next step forward. The WTO
offers an elaborate negotiating framework and support system, which
lends itself to addressing the difficult issues presented when nations ask
each other to give up the benefits of trade barriers in return for receiving
the benefits of better access to foreign markets. Furthermore, the culture
of the WTO involves negotiating complex agreements covering multiple
issues. In the context of such a package deal, countries that perceive
themselves as disadvantaged by provisions concerning fisheries subsi-
dies may be able to agree to such provisions because of other benefits
they would obtain if a final agreement were reached.
The WTO is famous, or notorious, for its dispute settlement system,
which is unique in international law. Unlike other international tribunals,
for which nations must assent to jurisdiction, which may offer advisory
rather than binding decisions, and which may impose no sanctions, the
WTO has compulsory jurisdiction over its members, its decisions are
binding on the parties to the dispute, and the prevailing party may be
authorized to impose sanctions upon the losing party if the decision is
not observed.'32 This powerful dispute settlement system has obvious
advantages for any international agreement. If an international agree-
ment to eliminate or minimize overfishing subsidies can be concluded
within the WTO framework, the WTO's strong enforcement tools will
make it much more likely that the agreement will actually be imple-
mented than if it were concluded outside the WTO framework.
The crucial questions for advocates of an agreement to reduce over-
fishing subsidies include (1) whether the WTO negotiating system is up
to the task of creating another package deal, or "single undertaking,"
reflecting a major new international trade agreement and, if so, (2)
whether the political will exists to include effective and new disciplines
on fisheries subsidies in such a deal.
In discussing the efforts of the international community to address
fisheries subsidies at the WTO, this Part first discusses the historical lack
of restrictions on fishing subsidies in international trade law. Second, it
discusses the recent efforts to reach a new international agreement to
130. Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis-e/tif_.e/org6-e.htm (last visited June 14, 2009).
131. E.g., Andrew E. Kramer, Russians and U.S. Push Hard on Trade, N.Y TIMES, July
12, 2006, at C I.
132. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 95, at 104.
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restrict overfishing subsidies. Third, it considers how well the negotiat-
ing text under consideration at the WTO would achieve the goal of
prohibiting overfishing subsidies. Finally, it briefly considers what may
come next in this long process.
A. International Trade Law Has Historically Applied Only
Very Limited Restrictions to Fisheries Subsidies
The current world trade regulatory regime is the descendant of an
organization and treaty developed after World War II to develop and co-
ordinate international trade.' The original treaty and organization, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), hosted rounds of
negotiations aimed at establishing international agreements to reduce
tariffs, since tariffs are barriers to international trade. 3 4 The GATT pro-
hibited export subsidies, except for those imposed upon primary
products such as products from fisheries.'35 If a member country believed
that a non-prohibited subsidy caused it "serious prejudice," it could uni-
laterally levy a countervailing duty under its domestic trade law. 3 6 In
order to levy such a countervailing duty, the complaining country had to
prove injury to the interests of a domestic industry.'37
While the United States in particular was successful in establishing
countervailing duties in some cases,'38 it became clear that the current
law did not successfully control fisheries subsidies. Instead, a 1992
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization ("FAO") study esti-
mated global fisheries subsidies at $54 billion and argued that subsidies
were a major cause of overfishing.39 The study was released in the con-
text of the Uruguay Round negotiations establishing the WTO, which
were concluded in December 1993.'4 While the FAO study sparked a
133. Id. at 1-9.
134. Id. at 5-6.
135. RONALD P. STEENBLIK, PREVIOUS MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO DISCIPLINE SUBSI-
DIES TO NATURAL RESOURCE BASED INDUSTRIES 6(1999).
136. Id.
137. Id. (explaining history of the injury requirement and that it was not imposed on the
United States until 1979).
138. See Christopher D. Stone, Too Many Fishing Boats, Too Few Fish: Can Trade Laws
Trim Subsidies and Restore the Balance in Global Fisheries?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 505, 522
(1997) (discussing cases concerning Canadian groundfish and Norwegian salmon).
139. RONALD P. STEENBLIK & GORDON R. MUNRO, INTERNATIONAL WORK ON FISHING
SUBSIDIES-AN UPDATE 4 (1999); Matteo Milazzo, Subsidies in World Fisheries: A Reexami-
nation, at 4 (World Bank, Technical Paper No. 406, 1998); Non-Fuel Subsidies, supra note 26,
at9.
140. The Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO was signed on April 15, 1994
with an effective date of January 1, 1995; see Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994),
available at http://www.wto.orglenglishldocsellegale/03-fa.pdf (last visited June 14, 2009).
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wave of interest in addressing the subsidies problem, by 1992 the nego-
tiations were already well underway. The resulting package failed to
explicitly address fishing subsidies. 4 And though trade in fish and fish
products could have been included in the WTO agriculture agreement, it
was not.' 42 Accordingly, regulation of fisheries subsidies was left to the
general provisions of the SCM, the new subsidies agreement established
by the Uruguay round.
The SCM established a broad definition of subsidy. 43 Unlike the
GATT, the SCM has no exception for primary products such as fisheries
products.' 44 But like the regime under the GATT, fisheries subsidies are
not prohibited.'45 Instead, fisheries subsidies are subject to enforcement
action only if they are "specific,' '4 6 and cause "adverse effects.' 47 To be
"specific" a subsidy must be explicitly limited to certain enterprises, in-
cluding subsidies operating within a designated geographical region.'1
4
To cause "adverse effects," a subsidy must cause injury to a domestic
industry, nullify benefits otherwise accruing to a member country under
the GATT 1994,' 9 or cause "serious prejudice."'5° "Serious prejudice" in
turn, exists if the subsidy displaces or impedes imports of a like product
into the market of the subsidizing country, or into the market of a third
country; causes significant lost sales, price suppression, price depression,
or price undercutting (as compared with the price of a like product in the
same market); or increases the world market share of the subsidizing
country in a particular product.' Thus, like the previous regime under
the GATT, the SCM requires a country complaining about a subsidy not
only to prove that the subsidy exists, but that the subsidy causes identifi-
able damage to the interests of a domestic industry or to trade in a like
product. Accordingly, the SCM did not make it appreciably more likely
that fisheries subsidies that cause overfishing would be controlled.
141. Milazzo, supra note 139, at 9.
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
144. Milazzo, supra note 139, at 9-10.
145. SCM Agreement, supra note 95, art. 3.
146. Id. art. 1.2.
147. Id. art. 5.
148. Id. art. 2.1.
149. The GATT 1994 is the new version of the tariff treaty adopted under the WTO
Agreement.
150. SCM Agreement, supra note 95, art. 5.
151. Id. art. 6.3.
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B. WTO Members Are Attempting to Revise the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures
While the Uruguay round of negotiations did not result in an explicit
agreement as to fisheries subsidies, it did sow the seed for future action.
The Agreement Establishing the WTO officially acknowledged the "ob-
jective of sustainable development" and that the parties to the agreement
sought to "protect and preserve the environment.' ' 2 Concurrent with the
WTO Agreement, the member nations established a Committee on Trade
and the Environment within the WTO to provide a forum for further dia-
logue on trade and the environment.'53 The 1996 Singapore ministerial
meeting approved the work of the Committee on Trade and the Envi-
ronment and directed it to continue."A
In May 1997, both New Zealand and the United States submitted
papers to the Committee pointing out the growing consensus that the
world's fisheries were declining, that overcapacity was a major cause of
this problem, and that fishing subsidies were a major cause of the over-
capacity.'55 The U.S. paper further suggested that fishing subsidies be
eliminated.'5 6 In response, the WTO Secretariat drafted a paper to serve
as a basis for discussion of fisheries subsidies and subsidies in five other
sectors.'57 The Secretariat followed up in March 1998 with a second pa-
per examining current WTO rules related to fisheries subsidies and
reviewing those fisheries subsidies of which the WTO had been noti-
fied. 58 Also in 1998, the "Friends of Fish" countries, an informal
coalition of States that strongly supported eliminating overfishing
152. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
153. Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment of 15 April 1994,
MTN/TNC/45(MIN) (Apr. 15, 1994).
154. Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 1996, 16, WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec. 18,
1996).
155. Submission of New Zealand to the Committee on Trade and the Environment, Item
6: The Fisheries Sector, WT/CTE/W/52 (May 21, 1997); Submission of the United States to
the Committee on Trade and the Environment, Environmental and Trade Benefits of Removing
Subsidies in the Fisheries Sector, WT/CTEIW/51 (May 19, 1997).
156. Submission of the United States to the Committee on Trade and the Environment,
Environmental and Trade Benefits of Removing Subsidies in the Fisheries Sector, T 20,
WT/CTE/W/51 (May 19, 1997).
157. WTO Secretariat, Note by the Secretariat, Environmental Benefits of Removing
Trade Restrictions and Distortions, WT/CTE/W/67 (Nov. 7, 1997); STEENBLIK & MUNRO,
supra note 139, at 9.
158. WTO Secretariat, Note by the Secretariat: GA7T/WTO Rules on Subsidies and Aids
Granted in the Fishing Industry, WT/CTE/W/80 (Mar. 9, 1998); STEENBLIK & MUNRO, supra
note 139, at 9.
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subsidies through WTO agreement, came together."9 At various times,
the coalition has included Argentina, Australia, Chile, Ecuador, Iceland,
New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Peru, the United States, and oth-
er countries. ,o
However, during the 1990s, the WTO and advocates of free trade
were gaining a reputation for hostility to the natural environment. There
are many reasons for this reputation, including the adverse environ-
mental impact of uncontrolled economic development, the relative lack
of environmental content in the WTO agreement, and a number of WTO
dispute decisions striking down environmental protections as impermis-
sible barriers to trade. 61 In addition, labor and environmental advocates
saw the WTO as a non-transparent specialized body dominated by nar-
row corporate interests rather than a body reflective of the full range of
policy concerns that should be considered when making important deci-
sions about the course of international trade.
62
Notwithstanding the hostility of some labor and environmental
groups to the WTO, many non-governmental and inter-governmental
organizations saw the WTO as an important forum for fisheries conser-
vation. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
rededicated itself to its policy work on fisheries subsidies in 1997.161 In
June 1997, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution concerning
the implementation of Agenda 21 for sustainable development, in which
it called for, among other things, consideration of the impact of subsidies
and appropriate action.' 6 Also in June 1997, the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme ("UNEP"), together with World Wildlife Fund,
hosted a workshop on fisheries subsidies and trade. 65 This workshop
marked the beginning of the substantial and continuous involvement of
both of those organizations with this issue. In November 1997, the Asia-
159. UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME, FISHERIES SUBSIDIES: A CRITICAL ISSUE FOR
TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AT THE WTO, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE 3 (2008)
[hereinafter UNEP].
160. Id. at 3 n.4.
161. See, e.g., David Hunter & Brennan Van Dyke, Trade and the Environment, 1 FOR-
EIGN POL'Y Focus 1, 1 (1996) ("Mexico's trade challenge to a U.S. law aimed at reducing the
number of dolphins killed in tuna fishing nets .... ); World Trade Organization, India etc.
Versus U.S.: 'Shrimp-Turtle', ENV'T: DISPUTES Apr. 2, 2007, at 8, http://www.wto.org/englishl
tratop-e/envir-e/edis08_e.htm; World Trade Organization, Mexico etc. Versus U.S.: 'Tuna-
Dolphin', ENV'T: DISPUTES Apr. 2, 2007, at 4, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
envire/edis04_e.htm.
162. See Hunter & Van Dyke, supra note 161, at 1; Greenpeace International, Why Is the
WTO a Problem?, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/campaigns/trade-and-the-
environment/
why-is-the-wto-a-problem (last visited June 14, 2009).
163. STEENBLIK & MUNRO, supra note 139, at 3.
164. Id. at 7; G.A. Res. S/19-2, $ 36(0, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-19/2 (Sept. 19, 1997).
165. STEENBLIK & MUNRO, supra note 139, at 7.
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Pacific Economic Co-operation forum resolved that its members should
progressively eliminate fishing subsidies, although the resolution was
not binding.' 66 In April 1998, the World Bank launched its involvement
with this issue through a report on subsidies in the world's fisheries. 167 In
March 1999, as the culmination of a two-year project, the FAQ approved
an International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capac-
ity.16 The Plan called for the nations of the world to eliminate, over time,
subsidies that contributed to overcapacity.' 69 Also in March 1999, the
WTO sponsored a symposium on trade and the environment attended by
government officials and representatives of civil society, including non-
governmental organizations. Australia, Iceland, New Zealand, the Phil-
ippines, and the United States called for fisheries subsidies to be
addressed during the next round of WTO negotiations scheduled to
commence with the 1999 Seattle Ministerial meeting. 7' The Interna-
tional Union for Conservation of Nature and the International Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Development started their engagement with fish-
eries subsidies issues by 1999.172
In the 1990s the hostility to the WTO and other international eco-
nomic institutions from environmental advocates joined with an even
more intense and broad-based hostility from labor advocates to create an
anti-globalization movement. That movement's protests came to a dra-
matic head at the Seattle Ministerial in 1999. Indeed, the massive
protests, coupled with poor responses by the WTO and local police, cre-
ated a public relations disaster for the WTO. 173 The disaster was
worsened by the collapse of the ministerial talks amid deep disagree-
ments among the parties.'74 But this disaster was also an opportunity. The
WTO became keenly aware that the credibility of the institution would
significantly benefit from showing that it did care about the environment.
166. Id. at 7-8.
167. Id. at 10; see Milazzo, supra note 139 (giving a reexamination of subsides in world
fisheries as of 1998).
168. STEENBLIK & MUNRO, supra note 139, at 5-6; Dominique Grrboval, International
Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity, in CURRENT FISHERIES ISSUES AND
THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (Myron H. Nordquist
& John Norton Moore eds., 1999).
169. Grrboval, supra note 168, para. 26.
170. STEENBLIK & MUNRO, supra note 139, at 9-10;
171. Id. at 10.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, World Trade Group Picking Up the Pieces From Seattle,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at C2.
174. See, e.g., Walden Bello, Debacle in Seattle: A Blow-by-Blow Account, Bus. WORLD,
Dec. 6, 1999, as reprinted at http://www.tni.org/detail-page.phtml?page=archivesbello
_debacle (last visited June 14, 2009).
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The fisheries subsidies issue has become a primary vehicle for the
WTO's attempt to rehabilitate its image.
The WTO took advantage of the opportunity to brand itself as pro-
environment when it (finally) began the new round of negotiations at
Doha in 2001. The WTO, optimistically in retrospect, planned for the
Doha Round to stretch across two additional Ministerial Meetings and to
be completed by January 1, 2005.' The Doha Declaration made a
significant change for fisheries by transferring the overfishing subsidies
topic from the Committee on Trade and the Environment to the "Rules"
Negotiating Group. The Committee on Trade and the Environment, use-
ful as it may have been, was a discussion group, not a negotiating group
tasked with reaching a new binding agreement. 76 The Doha Declaration
reaffirmed the commitment of the WTO to sustainable development and
to protecting the environment, and it specifically assigned the task of
clarifying and improving "WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies" to the
"Rules" negotiating group, 177 a group charged with, inter alia, negotiat-
ing amendments to the SCM.
7 1
Taking advantage of this new negotiating forum, in April 2002, the
Friends of Fish countries (which at that time included Australia, Chile,
Ecuador, Iceland, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, and the United States)
submitted a paper to the first negotiating session laying out the case that
fisheries subsidies were a serious problem and that the disciplines al-
ready contained in the SCM were inadequate to address them.'
79
Specifically, the paper argued that the SCM primarily addressed market
distortions arising from subsidies, but did "not adequately address other
negative trade, environment, and development impacts of fisheries subsi-
dies," including the adverse effects on trade caused by depletion of a
renewable resource that would ultimately deprive other member coun-
tries of access to a shared resource.' 80 The paper also argued that the
"heterogeneous nature of fisheries products, and the diffuse nature of
support to the sector" made it difficult to prove a market distortion case
under the SCM.''
In August 2002, the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable
Development ("WSSD") convened to mark the tenth anniversary of
175. Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 145, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I, 41
I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
176. World Trade Organization, Trade and Environment, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratopse/envir e/envir e.htm (last visited June 14, 2009).
177. Doha Declaration, supra note 175, $128, 3 1.
178. Id. T 28.
179. Submission of Australia et al. to the Negotiating Group on Rules, The Doha Man-
date to Address Fisheries Subsidies: Issues, TNIR[_W/3 (Apr. 24, 2002).
180. Id. at 1, 3-4.
181. Id. at 1, 4.
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Agenda 21."8 The WSSD issued its Plan of Implementation which called
for the elimination of subsidies that contributed to fishing overcapacity
and the completion of the WTO's work clarifying disciplines on fisheries
• 183
subsidies. As negotiations continued in early 2003, both the Friends of
Fish coalition and the United States, writing separately, submitted papers
aimed at beginning the discussion of solutions to the subsidies prob-
lem.'8'
The 2003 September Ministerial in Cancun collapsed, with the
members unable to reach agreement on concrete objectives for the nego-
tiating round.' 8 This collapse highlighted a major difficulty facing a
fisheries subsidy agreement: while the WTO's single undertaking phi-
losophy held the promise of including a fisheries agreement within a
more comprehensive package deal, the fact remained that there were
many issues at stake in the Round which were more important to the
Members than fisheries and that there was very strong disagreement on
these non-fisheries issues.
After a hiatus, the Doha Round was revived in 2004.16 In 2005,
Oceana started its Cut the Bait campaign to educate the public about the
importance of eliminating overfishing subsidies and to support (and
pressure) governments in reaching a successful WTO agreement.'87 The
Hong Kong Ministerial in December 2005 was meant to set a final out-
line of the parties' commitments (known as "modalities") so that
agreement could be reached by the end of 2006. '88 While Hong Kong did
not achieve an agreement on modalities, the meeting did make major
182. World Summit on Sustainable Development, Aug. 26-Sept. 4, 2002, Plan of Im-
plementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 199/20 (Sept. 4, 2002).
183. Id. 13 1(f).
184. Communication of the United States to the Negotiating Group on Rules, Possible
Approaches to Improved Disciplines on Fisheries Subsidies, TN/RL/W/77 (Mar. 19, 2003);
Submission of Argentina et al. to the Negotiating Group on Rules, Subsidies in the Fisheries
Sector: Possible Categorizations, TN/RLJW/58 (Feb. 10, 2003); Int'l Ctr. For Trade & Sus-
tainable Dev., Fisheries Subsidies: Deep Divisions Persist in WTO, 3 BRIDGES TRADE BIoREs
5 (2003); Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., 'Friends of Fish' Press for Negotiations on
Fisheries Subsidies at WTO, 3 BRIDGES TRADE BioREs 3 (2003).
185. World Trade Organization, Day 5: Conference Ends Without Consensus,
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/minist_e/min03_e/minO3_l4sept_e.htm (last visited
June 14, 2009).
186. World Trade Organization, Round-the-Clock Meetings Produce 'Historic' Break-
through, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news4_e/dda-package-sum_3 ljuly04_e.htm
(last visited June 14, 2009).
187. See, e.g., Communication of Australia et al. to the Negotiating Group on Rules,
Fisheries Subsidies, 4, TN/RL/W/235 (July 21, 2008) [hereinafter Fisheries Subsidies] ("En-
vironmental organizations such as Oceana have also worked tirelessly to raise the international
visibility of the negotiations.").
188. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005,
WT/MIN(05)/DEC (Dec. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Hong Kong Declaration].
Spring 2009]
Michigan Journal of International Law
progress toward resolving some of the disagreements among the Mem-
ber States. The Hong Kong Declaration strongly affirmed the place of
fisheries subsidies in the negotiations and set forth the goal of those ne-
gotiations at a new level of detail. Annex D of the Declaration, devoted
to the Negotiating Group on Rules, stated as follows:
[The Ministers] recall our commitment at Doha to enhancing the
mutual supportiveness of trade and environment, note that there
is broad agreement that the Group should strengthen disciplines
on subsidies in the fisheries sector, including through the
prohibition of certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute
to overcapacity and over-fishing, and call on Participants
promptly to undertake further detailed work to, inter alia, estab-
lish the nature and extent of those disciplines, including
transparency and enforceability. Appropriate and effective
special and differential treatment for developing and least-
developed Members should be an integral part of the fisheries
subsidies negotiations, taking into account the importance of this
sector to development priorities, poverty reduction, and liveli-
hood and food security concerns.189
After Hong Kong, negotiations on all fronts, including on fisheries sub-
sidies, proceeded slowly.
Nevertheless, the WTO Director-General made one last, forceful
push aimed at making substantial progress on all fronts.' 9° As part of this
effort, in November 2007, the Chair of the Rules Negotiating Group is-
sued, for the first time in the negotiations, a negotiating text of a new
agreement, which included text amending the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures to establish new disciplines on fisheries
subsidies.' 9' The Chair's text established specific prohibitions on subsi-
dies; set forth specific exceptions to these prohibitions that were
intended to allow subsidies for beneficial purposes such as research,
capacity reduction, and lessening the environmental impact of fisheries;
included provisions to allow the use of otherwise prohibited subsidies in
developing countries, subject to certain conditions; and established gen-
eral disciplines on all subsidies. 92 The Chair's text also set forth
189. Id. Annex D 9.
190. World Trade Organization, Lamy Urges Further Acceleration of Negotiations,
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news07_e/tncchair_report-octO7_e.htm (last visited June
14, 2009).
191. Negotiating Group on Rules, Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM
Agreements, TN/RLW/213 (Nov. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Chair's Text].
192. Id. arts. i-iv. See generally Fisheries Subsidies, supra note 187, 6 (summarizing
key points of Chair's text).
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provisions concerning fisheries management and various technical is-
sues. 93 The Friends of Fish viewed the Chair's text on fisheries as
making a substantial commitment to strong disciplines.9 Other devel-
oped and developing Member States concurred with the need for
disciplines but sought more limited prohibitions on subsidies.'" After
further discussions, the Chair issued an annotated text in May 2008 re-
flecting the continued divergence in views, in an effort to move the
process forward.
196
As part of the last intensive push to reach agreement, the WTO con-
vened a ministerial meeting in Geneva in July 2008 to reach agreement
on modalities in the key areas of agriculture and industrial goods.'97 The
negotiators failed to reach agreement yet again.'9 There has been a great
deal of effort since July 2008 to break the deadlock in talks, but at the
time of writing it is unclear whether the disagreements among the parties
that have caused the slow progress in negotiations can be bridged.' 99
C. The Chair's Negotiating Text Made Significant Progress Toward
Eliminating Overfishing Subsidies
Notwithstanding all the negotiating setbacks discussed above, it re-
mains vital to the health of the marine environment that the international
community pursue an agreement. This section discusses the general pro-
hibitions and exceptions in the Chair's text, its treatment of developing
countries, and its general disciplines on subsidies in relation to the over-
arching goal of prohibiting overfishing subsidies.
193. Chair's Text, supra note 191, arts. V-VIII.
194. See, e.g., Communication of Argentina et al. to the Negotiating Group on Rules,
Statement on the Negotiation on Fisheries Subsidies, TN/RL/W/234 (July 17, 2008); Fisheries
Subsidies, supra note 187, ' 6 ("The Chair's draft text of a new fisheries subsidies agreement
represents a substantial advance in the negotiations and a landmark in the efforts of the world
community to get global fisheries back on a sustainable path. The text addresses all the key
issues in innovative and thoughtful ways, drawing on virtually all contributions made by
Members.").
195. See, e.g., Submission of India & Indonesia to the Negotiating Group on Rules, Need
for Effective Special & Differential Treatment for Developing Country Members in the Pro-
posed Fisheries Subsidies Text, at 1, TN/RIJGEN/155 (Apr. 22, 2008) ("[W]e make a strong
case for effective and unconditional S&D provisions in the Chair's text." (emphasis added)).
196. Negotiating Group on Rules, Working Document from the Chairman,
TN/RL/W/232 (May 28, 2008) [hereinafter Working Document].
197. Press Release, World Trade Org., Director-General's Letter to Journalists (July 17,
2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/meet08_brief09_e.htm (last
visited June 14, 2009).
198. Press Release, World Trade Org., Day 9: Talks Collapse Despite Progress on a List
of Issues (July 30, 2008), available at http://www.wto.orglenglishnews-e/news08_e/
meet08_summary_29julye.htm (last visited June 14, 2009).
199. See, e.g., Alan Beattie, Doha Round: The Saga That Became a Never-Ending Story,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at 6, available at http://www.ft.comlcms/s/O/d3ecfbOa-94ca-Ildd-
953e-000077b07658.html (last visited June 14, 2009).
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1. General Prohibitions and Exceptions on Fishing Subsidies
in the Chair's Text
There is a good general case to be made that all subsidies to fisheries
within the meaning of the SCM, whether specific or not, tend to increase
capacity and lead to excess capacity and overfishing. Accordingly, the
conservation advocate should try to get an enforceable prohibition on all,
or as many of such subsidies as is possible. Within the context of the
SCM, the enforcement problems associated with the "adverse effects"
section of the SCM could be addressed through an existing technique:
imposition of a "prohibited" subsidy (as discussed in SCM Article 3).
Since all Article 3 subsidies are deemed to be specific, amending Article
3 to prohibit subsidies to fishing enterprises would be an effective solu-
tion to the problem.
The give and take of negotiation at the WTO, however, is unlikely to
allow such a broad agreement. While the idea that all fisheries subsidies
should be deemed specific certainly has been raised during negotiations,
it has not generated significant supportr ° The unwillingness to deem all
fisheries subsidies specific may lead to some troubling evasions. For ex-
ample, this Essay discussed earlier the damaging environmental impacts
caused by subsidizing fuel for fishing vessels. Many nations have reason
to and currently do subsidize other uses of fuel, which could be
classified together with use in fishing vessels to create an arguably
non-specific subsidy. For example, a government could subsidize all
non-road uses of diesel, perhaps by exempting such uses from taxation.2"'
Such a non-specific subsidy could significantly decrease the operating
costs of fishing enterprises while remaining beyond the reach of the
agreement.
Furthermore, even within the realm of specific fisheries subsidies,
negotiators contended that there were certain subsidies that should be
allowed. This debate gave rise to discussion as to whether the fisheries
subsidies agreement should be "top down," or "bottom-up," by which the
negotiators meant whether an agreement should contain a broad prohibi-
tion on subsidies from which exceptions were carved out, or, on the
other hand, whether an agreement should contain a list of specific subsi-
200. See UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME ET AL., WTO DISCIPLINES ON FISHERIES
SUBSIDIES: ELEMENTS OF THE CHAIR'S DRAFT para. 11 (2008) [hereinafter WTO DISCI-
PLINES]. But see Working Document, supra note 196, Annex C at I (stating that no delegations
expressed concern about maintaining the specificity requirement).
201. Australia, for example, has a fuel tax credit that applies to fisheries and many other
activities. Australian Taxation Office, Fuel Tax Credits: Get Money Back for Your Business,




dies that were prohibited . 2 The concern of the United States and other
backers of the "top-down" approach was that it would be easy to inad-
vertently fail to specify a subsidy, which should be prohibited by the
bottom-up approach.
The Chair's text synthesized these two approaches by, on one hand,
listing prohibited subsidies but, on the other hand, making the prohibi-
tions broad and coupling them with general conditions on all subsidies.
The Chair's text would prohibit specific subsidies for (1) new or reno-
vated vessels, (2) the transfer of fishing vessels to other countries, (3)
operating costs, (4) port infrastructure exclusively or predominantly for
activities related to marine fishing, (5) income support, (6) price support,
and (7) the transfer of foreign access rights to domestic fishing enter-
prises.2 °3
The text included a second article detailing exceptions for subsidies
that are not supposed to lead to harmful excess capacity. Under Article
II, all countries, including developed countries, would be able to admin-
ister subsidies for (1) natural disaster relief, (2) improving vessel or crew
safety subject to certain conditions, (3) the adoption of more selective
fishing gear, (4) the adoption of other techniques to reduce the environ-
mental impacts of fishing, (5) improved compliance with fisheries
management regimes, (6) re-education, re-training, or re-deployment of
fishers, (7) early retirement or cessation of employment of fishers, (8)
vessel decommissioning, and (9) user-specific allocations to groups un-
204der limited access privileges and other exclusive quota programs.
Furthermore, to address developing countries' concerns over the possible
loss of foreign income from the sale of access rights, the transfer of ac-
cess rights from the purchasing government to its fleet is not prohibited
so long as the fishing is to take place in the EEZ of a developing country
and certain other conditions are met.205
It can be debated to what extent the additional subsidies allowed by
Article II detract from the goal of eliminating harmful overfishing subsi-
dies. Some of the Article H exceptions fall within the category of "good"
subsidies that are aimed at improving sustainability, and others that
could be either "good" or "bad" are subject to conditions that push them
in the good direction. For example, the Article 11(a) exception for im-
proving vessel safety does not apply to a subsidy involving new vessel
construction' 6 Thus, while it might be desirable to make these
202. See, e.g., Working Document, supra note 196, annex C at 2 (third column).
203. Chair's Text, supra note 191, art. 1.1.
204. Id. art. H.
205. Id. art. 1H.3.
206. Id. art. 11(a).
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exceptions subject to some sort of general sustainability provision, they
do not represent an unreasonable compromise.
2. The Treatment of Developing Countries in the Chair's Text
In addition to the limitations on a general prohibition on subsidies
noted above, the WTO negotiations through the Doha Round also carry
with them the requirement for special and differential treatment of de-
veloping countries.2°' The important concern for the conservationist is
that valid considerations of economic development should not be al-
lowed to override needs for sustainability. Accordingly, subsidies that
contribute to overfishing must be opposed in the context of developing
as well as in the context of developed countries.
The Doha Declaration set forth as its principal goal promoting the
economic development of developing countries and alleviating poverty
through international trade.208 The Declaration noted that "[i]n this con-
text, . . . well targeted, sustainably financed technical assistance and
capacity-building program[s] have important roles to play."2 ° The Work
Programme further stated that the "participants shall also aim to clarify
and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies, taking into account
the importance of this sector to developing countries.'' 210 In the Hong
Kong Declaration, the WTO ministers repeated their commitment to de-
velopment, stating, "[w]e emphasize the central importance of the
development dimension in every aspect of the Doha Work Programme
and recommit ourselves to making it a meaningful reality."'21 In the con-
text of fisheries subsidies, the developing countries have worked
strenuously to implement these commitments by insisting on the need
for subsidies to assist in economic development.
There are valid economic arguments for administering development
subsidies. With respect to fisheries, subsidies allow governments in de-
veloping countries to offset economic conditions that prevent their infant
industries from expanding. Such conditions might include the lack of a
developed distribution network that would enable fishing enterprises to
get their goods to the market, lack of refrigeration and other infrastruc-
ture to preserve the catch, and lack of capital because of ill-formed
capital markets. Subsidies, if appropriately administered, can assist de-
veloping countries to displace foreign fleets in favor of their own, thus
207. Doha Declaration, supra note 175, 44.
208. Id. $ 2.
209. Id.
210. Id. 1 28 (emphasis added).
211. Hong Kong Declaration, supra note 188, 2 (emphasis added).
212. William E. Schrank, Introducing Fisheries Subsidies, at 6 (Food & Agric. Org. of
the UN, Fisheries Technical Paper No. 437, 2003).
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enhancing their food security and transferring the welfare generated by
fishing enterprises from developed country fleets to developing country
fleets. In addition, by improving distribution networks and infrastructure
these subsidies can make higher quality fish available to consumers and
make fish available to consumers who previously could not purchase
them.
Because subsidies will increase fishing capacity, these valid eco-
nomic arguments do not support subsidies to fishing enterprises unless
the enterprises are fishing on underexploited fish populations. Further-
more, these subsidies must be capped so that they do not increase
capacity to the point where it is so great that fishing will no longer be
sustainable. While there may be some fish populations in some comers
of the world that remain underexploited, for the most part fish popula-
tions are fully or overexploited.2 3 Accordingly, these subsidies should
not be allowed under a fisheries subsidies agreement except where it is
well-documented that there is room for growth in fishing capacity.
Further, operating cost subsidies would never be appropriate, as
these subsidies do not address infrastructure and distribution network
deficiencies that developing countries and infant industries face.14 In-
deed, subsidies for operating costs are very inefficient, creating
significant economic losses. A fisherman may do no more than break
even financially even with subsidized input costs. But the subsidy
amount could have been used for other purposes such as tax breaks for
the poor or for other government expenditures such as infrastructure that
have higher social returns. As UNEP recently observed, social policy
goals "can be achieved more effectively through alternative mechanisms
involving direct welfare payments or investment in social services, since
the economic efficiency losses and environmental effects are less marked
[than through energy subsidies] .2 5
The Chair's text responds to the demand for special and differential
treatment, allowing somewhat more liberal subsidies than are desirable
from the point of view of sustainability, but nevertheless including provi-
sions that limit the sustainability impact. The text allows those States
officially classified as "least-developed" to administer any subsidies they
desire.2 6 In addition, the Chair's text allows other developing countries
to administer subsidies for infrastructure, income support, and price
213. B. FREITAS ET AL., Too FEW FISH: A REGIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE WORLD'S
FISHERIES 1 (2008) ("[O]nly 17% of the world's fisheries should be considered capable of any
growth in catch at all.").
214. Cf WTO DISCIPLINES, supra note 200, para. 27.
215. UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME, REFORMING ENERGY SUBSIDIES: OPPORTU-
NITIES TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE CLIMATE CHANGE AGENDA 24 (2008).
216. Chair's Text, supra note 191, art. I11..
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support." 7 It also includes a complicated attempt to classify fisheries in
such developing countries according to how industrial they are, estab-
lishing three tiers." ' In the most technologically primitive tier, any
subsidy is allowed, while in the highest tier, capital subsidies, such as for
building new vessels are allowed, subject to certain conditions such as
stock assessment.2 9
3. The General Disciplines on Subsidies in the Chair's Text
The Chair's text contains some general safety net provisions on the
subsidies that it allows, such as the requirement that a fishery manage-
ment system must be in place, that fish stocks must be assessed, or that a
transfer agreement is transparent. 20 None of these conditions are strong
enough to ensure that the subsidy will only affect an underexploited
population of fish. There are, however, general, across-the-board disci-
plines that apply to all the subsidies except the Article I exceptions.
Subsidies must satisfy three general conditions. First, they cannot be
administered on an "unequivocally overfished" stock.22 Second, they
cannot cause harm or depletion or create overcapacity with respect to a
straddling fish stock whose range includes the EEZ of another member
country. Finally, they cannot cause harm or depletion or create overca-
pacity with respect to a fish stock in which another member country has
identifiable fishing interests.222
The most general sustainability condition of the three is the Article
1.2 prohibition on subsidies affecting an "unequivocally overfished"
stock.223 The phrase "unequivocally overfished" however, would seem to
pose great difficulty for a dispute resolution panel.224 While the panel
would attempt to give the phrase meaning, it would probably result in a
very, very high standard of proof. Such a high standard of proof is the
opposite of the best conservation policy which follows a precautionary
approach. Under a precautionary approach, in the case of uncertainty, a
decision maker should err on the side of conserving the resource, not on
the side of allowing a possibly harmful activity. Accordingly, it would be
a very constructive step if further negotiations could give a more definite
meaning to the "overfished" criterion of Article 1.2 that would allow for
a more precautionary application.
217. Id. art. IH.2(b)(1).
218. Id. art. Il.
219. Id.
220. Id. arts. V-VT.
221. The least developed countries are not subject to this discipline. See id. art. H1. 1.
222. Id. arts. 1.2, IV.
223. Id. art. 1.2.
224. Cf WTO DISCIPLINES, supra note 200, para. 13.
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The Article IV disciplines on subsidies harming straddling fish
stocks and stocks in which another member has an interest address the
important case of shared resources. In effect, this discipline attempts to
limit any adverse effects caused by the special and differential treatment
given to developing countries to those countries' solely-owned resources.
Article IV has a lower standard of proof than Article 1.2: the evidence
need not be unequivocal. Article IV could also be interpreted to be
broader than Article 1.2. Although the terms are not defined in the
Chair's text, it seems plausible that a dispute resolution body could find
that a situation of "depletion," "harm," or "over-capacity" existed with
respect to a stock of fish, even if the stock was not yet overfished, so
long as the stock size was trending downwards and/or yields were, or
were about to be, at higher than sustainable levels. It is not clear from
the text, however, in what way this general discipline would be enforced.
The Chair's text also addresses important technical concerns regard-
ing transparency, review of compliance, enforcement, and sanctions. A
successful agreement must require that countries notify the WTO, with
sufficient data, of the existence of fisheries subsidies, so that their poten-
tially harmful impact on the environment can be discovered. The Chair's
text contains provisions which attempt to address this need." 5 Further-
more, the Chair's text provides that enforcement against prohibited
overfishing subsidies should not be disproportionate and allows for, in
addition to other sanctions available under the WTO, proportionate sanc-
tions such as suspending access of fishing vessels to port facilities. 6
D. Options for Moving Forward
As of this writing, the WTO member countries continue to explore
ways to move forward the Doha Round negotiations. Notwithstanding
the compromises from the ideal conservation position contained within
the Chair's text, some Member States have criticized the text as too am-
bitious, and there is a strong possibility that if WTO talks continue, the
Chair's text will be further compromised. How much compromise is too
much? This is both a fair question and a question that an advocate still
hoping to be engaged in the process cannot be expected to answer. An
advocate for fish conservation must consider the expected cost and bene-
fit of taking any particular negotiating stance. It seems clear that the
Chair's text represents such a significant improvement over current poli-
cies that its compromises are worth the bargain. It also seems clear that
if it were politically necessary to make certain further limited
225. See, e.g., Chair's Text, supra note 191, art. VI.
226. Working Document, supra note 196, Annex C at 2 (revising SCM Agreement, supra
note 95, § 3.1).
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compromises to reach an agreement, the agreement would still be worth
the effort. On the other hand, any agreement that would allow substantial
subsidization to continue in developed countries or would allow develop-
ing countries to subsidize activities that would threaten straddling stocks
or common resources on the high seas would seem to offer too little pro-
gress to be deemed a success.
Conventional wisdom holds that domestic politics in several coun-
tries may make it difficult for the Doha Round to vigorously resume
negotiations for some time. Conventional wisdom also holds that until
and unless the Doha Round is officially declared to be over, it will be
difficult to get the Member States to consider establishing any form of
fishing conservation agreement-including an agreement to ban over-
fishing subsidies--outside of the WTO forum. So it may be that the best
course, over the mid-term, is to continue pushing the WTO and its mem-
ber countries to resume and successfully finish the Doha Round. Should
the Doha negotiations finally and completely collapse, there are a num-
ber of options. The best option may be to attempt to continue to take
advantage of the WTO forum by seeking to persuade all or some of the
countries to enter into a trade agreement limited to fisheries only. The
agreement might be restricted to subsidies, or it might take into account
other aspects of fisheries trade.
If the WTO does not appear to be a viable forum, or if it does not
appear possible to get general agreement on fisheries subsidies outside
the context of a comprehensive trade agreement covering multiple sub-
ject areas, nations interested in conserving the world's marine resources
may have to adopt an incremental approach. One way to do so would be
to attempt to introduce fisheries subsidies agreements into regional free
trade agreements as they move forward. Regional trade agreements such
as the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") have become
increasingly popular over the last few years2. and would likely become
even more popular if the main WTO negotiations stalled. One advantage
of seeking to introduce fisheries subsidies controls into regional trade
agreements is that such agreements already include strong dispute reso-
lution and enforcement provisions.
Another way forward would be to attempt to forge general fisheries
agreements among smaller groups of countries, and then to attempt to
227. World Trade Organization, Regional Trade Agreements: Facts and Figures: How
Many Regional Trade Agreements Have Been Notified to the WTO?, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/region.e/regfac..e.htm (last visited June 14, 2009).
228. See, e.g., JOHN KIRTON, NAFTA DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS: AN OVER-
VIEW (2004), available at http://www.envireform.utoronto.ca/publications/john-kirton/may27-




expand these agreements at a later date. It is conceivable that the Friends
of Fish nations would be willing to enter into an agreement to ban over-
fishing subsidies, either as a stand-alone agreement or as a sub-
agreement to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The troubling aspect of such partial agreements, of course, is that the
collapse of fisheries resources is a global problem. It seems plausible
that the worst offenders-States that would be likely to subsidize so as to
injure both common resources on the high seas and their own domestic
resources-would be unwilling to enter such partial agreements. But
international trade law provides a method to influence such countries, as
was illustrated by the WTO Appellate Body decision in United States-
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products. 229 The
Shrimp/Turtle case concerned the United States' attempt to require other
countries to use turtle excluder devices in their shrimp trawls to protect
sea turtles. The Appellate Body Report established that a State (there, the
United States) may impose a unilateral trade sanction against another
State if it establishes pursuant to the World Trade Agreement's GATT
Article XX(g) (1) that the measure is "relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources"23 and is in conjunction with domestic re-
strictions and (2) that under the introductory paragraph of Article XX,
known as the chapeau, the measure as applied does not constitute arbi-
232trary or unjustifiable discrimination.
In the Shrimp/Turtle case, the Appellate Body found that Article
23XX(g) applies to regulations meant to protect living marine resources.
While it ultimately found that the application of the U.S. measures under
challenge constituted unjustifiable discrimination,2 3' the Report provided
guidance on how to appropriately apply such measures in the future.
Specifically, the country seeking to impose sanctions (1) cannot impose
sanctions if the other country has comparable environmental protections,
even if those protections are not exactly the same; 23' and (2) prior to im-
posing sanctions, the sanctioning country must engage in serious
negotiations to attempt to reach a multilateral or bilateral agreement to
236
address the issue.
The power to use trade sanctions to conserve fisheries is already es-
tablished in U.S. fisheries law. Subsequent to the initial Shrimp-Turtle
229. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
230. Id. 135-142.
231. Id. - 143-45.
232. Id. 160.
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decision, the United States revised its turtle excluder device certification
regulations and the WTO upheld the new system. 37 In 2006, Congress
expanded this power, enacting into law a requirement that the govern-
ment identify and sanction countries that have not adopted programs
comparable to those in the United States to end or reduce marine bycatch
and to conserve "protected living marine resources. 238 The United States
and other nations could use a similar strategy to try to eliminate fisheries
subsidies by negotiating bilateral and multilateral subsidies agreements
and by threatening to impose unilateral trade sanctions against the coun-
tries that refused to participate in such agreements.
CONCLUSION
As with the other great, and much better known, environmental cri-
sis of our times, global climate change, it is clear that international
agreement is necessary to conserve fisheries, that time is short, and that
irreversible damage may well be inflicted by 2050 or earlier if action is
not timely taken. The trend toward the collapse of commercial fisheries
by 2050 is global. It affects not only resources in individual State's juris-
diction, but also shared straddling stocks and common resources on the
high seas. There is abundant evidence that one of the most significant
causes of the decline of commercial fisheries is government subsidies
administered by many nations around the world. The WTO as a negotiat-
ing and dispute resolution forum is uniquely well-suited to the challenge
of reaching and enforcing an agreement across international boundaries
to control these subsidies.
Just as with global climate change, while there are opportunities to
make progress, there is no certainty that the nations of the world will be
able to overcome their narrower interests in such a way so as to ensure
the protection of their larger mutual interest in a sustainable environ-
ment. But we have already made significant progress. Never before has
the WTO considered restricting subsidies to control their impact on the
environment, as opposed to disciplining subsidies to control their effect
on trade. The WTO negotiations already constitute a signal advance in
the international community's acknowledgement of the need to address
the unintended effects of trade policy on the Earth's ecosystems.
237. Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, 135, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001).
238. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of
2006, § 403, 109 Pub. L. No. 479, 121 Stat. 3575, 3630-32 (2006) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1826(k)).
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In the current uncertain situation, we have little choice but to work
assiduously for the best result possible, choosing the tools and the paths
that seem to offer the best promise of success. If the WTO negotiations
can be brought to a successful conclusion, we must work hard to ensure
that the new agreement contains the most effective disciplines on fisher-
ies subsidies that can be obtained. If the WTO negotiations remain
stalled, the nations of the world must seek to control subsidies through
regional trade agreements, multi- and bi-lateral fisheries agreements,
and, if necessary, the appropriate threat of unilateral sanctions.
